The present study aims to extend research on the role of values for the perceived legitimacy of legal authorities by focusing on (1) supranational legal authorities and (2) a broad range of values. We examine how (alignment between) people’s personal values and their perception of the values of the European Union (EU) are related to perceived legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the EU more broadly. Inspired by moral foundations theory, we distinguish between individualizing (i.e., (...) “democracy”, “liberty”, and “fairness”) and binding values (i.e., “rule of law”, “respect for national authority”, and “respect for tradition”). An online survey was conducted in six EU member states (N = 1,136). A factor analysis confirmed a two-factor model (individualizing vs. binding values) for both personal values and perceived EU values. Four regression models were run for each of the value factors, including personal values, perceived EU values, and their interaction, on each of the outcomes (i.e., perceived CJEU and EU legitimacy). Perceived endorsement by the EU of both individualizing and binding values predicted higher legitimacy perceptions of the CJEU and EU. Furthermore, personal binding values had a negative effect on perceived EU legitimacy when participants perceived the EU to weakly support binding values, but a positive effect when the EU was perceived to strongly support binding values. The results suggest that value alignment plays an important role in perceived legitimacy of the CJEU and EU, and that better representing binding values might be a strategy to improve perceived EU legitimacy. (shrink)

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal conse- quences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality’s intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity’s (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations (...) and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality’s short-term con- sequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

Many individuals with developmental language disorder (DLD) and individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing (D/HH) have social–emotional problems, such as social difficulties, and show signs of aggression, depression, and anxiety. These problems can be partly associated with their executive functions (EFs) and theory of mind (ToM). The difficulties of both groups in EF and ToM may in turn be related to self-directed speech (i.e., overt or covert speech that is directed at the self). Self-directed speech is thought to (...) allow for the construction of non-sensory representations (i.e., representations that do not coincide with direct observation). Such non-sensory representations allow individuals to overcome the limits set upon them by the senses. This ability is constrained by the development of word meaning structure (i.e., the way words are understood). We argue that the greater ability to construct non-sensory representations may result in more enhanced forms of EF and ToM. We conclude that difficulties in EF, ToM, and social–emotional functioning in those with hearing and language problems may be accounted for in terms of word meaning impairments. We propose that word meaning structure and self-directed speech should be considered in assigning EF and ToM treatments to individuals with DLD and those who are D/HH. (shrink)

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal consequences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality's intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity's (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations and (...) so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality's short-term consequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality. (shrink)

In his recent book Slaves of the Passions , Mark Schroeder defends a Humean account of practical reasons ( hypotheticalism ). He argues that it is compatible with 'genuinely agent-neutral reasons'. These are reasons that any agent whatsoever has. According to Schroeder, they may well include moral reasons. Furthermore, he proposes a novel account of a reason's weight, which is supposed to vindicate the claim that agent-neutral reasons ( if they exist), would be weighty irrespective of anyone's desires. If the (...) argument is successful, it could help avoid an error-theory of moral language. I argue that it isn't, and that we should reject a Humean approach to reasons. (shrink)

Moral contextualism is the view that claims like ‘A ought to X’ are implicitly relative to some (contextually variable) standard. This leads to a problem: what are fundamental moral claims like ‘You ought to maximize happiness’ relative to? If this claim is relative to a utilitarian standard, then its truth conditions are trivial: ‘Relative to utilitarianism, you ought to maximize happiness’. But it certainly doesn’t seem trivial that you ought to maximize happiness (utilitarianism is a highly controversial position). Some people (...) believe this problem is a reason to prefer a realist or error theoretic semantics of morals. I argue two things: first, that plausible versions of all these theories are afflicted by the problem equally, and second, that any solution available to the realist and error theorist is also available to the contextualist. So the problem of triviality does not favour noncontextualist views of moral language. (shrink)

For X a separable metric space and $\alpha$ an infinite ordinal, consider the following three games of length $\alpha$ : In $G^{\alpha}_1$ ONE chooses in inning $\gamma$ an $\omega$ –cover $O_{\gamma}$ of X; TWO responds with a $T_{\gamma}\in O_{\gamma}$ . TWO wins if $\{T_{\gamma}:\gamma<\alpha\}$ is an $\omega$ –cover of X; ONE wins otherwise. In $G^{\alpha}_2$ ONE chooses in inning $\gamma$ a subset $O_{\gamma}$ of ${\sf C}_p(X)$ which has the zero function $\underline{0}$ in its closure, and TWO responds with a function (...) $T_{\gamma}\in O_{\gamma}$ . TWO wins if $\underline{0}$ is in the closure of $\{T_{\gamma}:\gamma<\alpha\}$ ; otherwise, ONE wins. In $G^{\alpha}_3$ ONE chooses in inning $\gamma$ a dense subset $O_{\gamma}$ of ${\sf C}_p(X)$ , and TWO responds with a $T_{\gamma}\in O_{\gamma}$ . TWO wins if $\{T_{\gamma}:\gamma<\alpha\}$ is dense in ${\sf C}_p(X)$ ; otherwise, ONE wins. After a brief survey we prove: 1. If $\alpha$ is minimal such that TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_1$ , then $\alpha$ is additively indecomposable (Theorem 4) 2. For $\alpha$ countable and minimal such that TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_1$ on X, the following statements are equivalent (Theorem 9): a) TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_2$ on ${\sf C}_p(X)$ . b) TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\alpha}_3$ on ${\sf C}_p(X)$ . 3. The Continuum Hypothesis implies that there is an uncountable set X of real numbers such that TWO has a winning strategy in $G^{\omega^2}_1$ on X (Theorem 10). (shrink)

Peter Kivy claims that expressivists in aesthetics cannot explain why we argue about art. The situation would be different in the case of morals. Moral attitudes lead to action, and since actions affect people, we have a strong incentive to change people’s moral attitudes. This can explain why we argue about morals, even if moral language is expressive of our feelings. However, judgements about what is beautiful and elegant need not significantly affect our lives. So why be concerned with other (...) people’s feelings about art? Kivy thinks the best explanation of our tendency to argue about art is that we implicitly believe in objective facts about aesthetics. This would count against expressivism. I argue two things: that there is no good reason to think that we don’t care about preferences and emotions unless they have significant practical consequences and that the truth of expressivism about aesthetic language is compatible with beliefs about objective aesthetic facts. (shrink)

This book offers an important study of Aristotle's theory of the sense-organs. It aims to answer two questions central to Aristotle's psychology and biology: why does Aristotle think we have sense-organs, and why does he describe the sense-organs in the way he does? The author looks at all the Aristotelian evidence for the five senses and shows how pervasively Aristotle's accounts of the sense-organs are motivated by his interest in form and function. The book also engages with the celebrated problem (...) of whether perception for Aristotle requires material changes in the perceiver. It argues that, surprisingly to the modern philosopher, nothing in Aristotle's description of the sense-organs requires us to believe in such changes. (shrink)

Why should Aristotle reject his own criteria for a science to admit this puzzling science of being? Or does he really reject them? Perhaps the science of being is not intended to be a universal science of the type rejected elsewhere. The Metaphysics and the Organon are not concerned with exactly the same questions; and verbal differences may not reflect real or important doctrinal conflicts.

It is a consequence of Quine’s confirmation holism that the logical laws are in principle revisable. Some have worried this is at odds with another dictum in Quine, viz., that any translation which construes speakers as systematically illogical is ipso facto inadequate. In this paper, I try to formulate exactly what the problem is here, and offer a solution to it by (1) disambiguating the term ‘logic,’ and (2) appealing to a Quinean understanding of ‘necessity.’ The result is that the (...) different theses in Quine’s philosophy of logic are to be situated within different contexts of inquiry. (shrink)

Despite the concern with oppressive systems and practices there have been few attempts to analyse the general concept of oppression. Recently, Iris Marion Young has argued that it is not possible to analyse oppression as a unitary moral category. Rather, the term ‘oppression’ refers to several distinct structures, namely, exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. This paper rejects Young's claim and advances a general theory of oppression. Drawing insight from American chattel slavery and the situation of the German Jews (...) during the 1930's, I argue that to be oppressed is to be unjustly denied the opportunity for what I call ‘resilient autonomy’. I argue that all instances of oppression can usefully be analysed in these terms. I test my analysis against each of Young's five structures of oppression, concluding that in each case they are captured by my analysis. (shrink)

T. M. Rudavsky tells the story of the development of Jewish philosophy from the 10th century to Spinoza in the 17th, as part of a dialogue with medieval Christian and Islamic thought. She gives a broad historical survey of major figures and schools within the medieval Jewish tradition, focusing on the tensions between Judaism and rational thought.

Beginning with a review of Michael Pollan's latest book about the renaissance of research into the use of psychedelics to treat addiction, depression, and end-of-life anxiety, this essay considers wisdom and insight that might be gained by examining the psychedelic practices of primitive people. Pollan finds that almost all who begin using psychedelics to treat the ill eventually come to the conclusion that they should be made available for the broader purpose of 'the betterment of well people'. By considering both (...) scientific and spiritual perspectives on these compounds, the book offers insight into the toxicity not only of our mental environment, but at the same time our relationship to fellow humanity and Mother Nature. However, Pollan does not consider what is perhaps the greatest source of wisdom regarding the pharmacological potential of psychedelics: primitive societies who have long incorporated these compounds into their ways of being. By casting anthropological accounts of primitive psychedelic practices against those of contemporary research, this essay seeks to deepen enquiry into the pathologies of modern personhood as they bear upon the ecological crisis, together with the potential value of entheogens for understanding and responding to these problems. (shrink)

Questions about knowledge, and about the relation between logic and language, are at the heart of philosophy. Eleven distinguished philosophers from Britain and America contribute papers on such questions. All the contributions are examples of recent philosophy at its best. The first half of the book constitutes a running debate about knowledge, evidence and doubt. The second half tackles questions about logic and its relation to language.

On Cārvāka school of philosophy, with refutation of other schools in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism.

I am trying to develop a specific methodology of understanding nature of aims and intentions. There are three groups of the main problems. Firstly, the principal openness of the future and, in particular, the idea of self-organization require new methodology - the so called synergetic one. According to the synergetical approach the aim and idea have attractive power and are very important mechanisms of human activity and they They include the energetic capacity and can berepresented as peculiar energetic resource of (...) human behaviour. Secondly, it would be especially important to consider positive and creative contents of aims and a high level of culture mentality and way of thinking. On the contrary - without aims acts - the man as a rational being acts in a spontaneous and unpredictable way, forgets its previous states and loses his systemic memory. The third group of problems concerns an important idea of human reflection as an open non-equilibrium information system. The evolution prospect of such systems allows numerous combinations of the development. The mental image of the aimcan be understood as an intensive directional resource for actions. The meaning of the conception charisma is analyzed in this article. The charisma is defined as a type of social energy. I try to explain the relationships between charismatical persons and other people. (shrink)

This book provides a perceptive analysis of the "narrative turn" that led Paul Ricoeur to his magisterial work Time and Narrative. Ricoeur has for many years explored the intersections of diverse strands of European philosophy, but it is his recent work that has attracted the most discussion and engendered the most debate in Europe and America. The Narrative Path explores the roots and meaning of that work. Two of the book's five essays reach back to Ricoeur's earlier work to clarify (...) his themes: Richard Kearney concentrates on the role of imagination in hermeneuties, and Maria Villela Petit explores the development of Ricoeur's concept of history from History and Truth to Time and Narrative. Two essays analyze the significance of Ricoeur's reflections on metaphoric and narrative language: Serge Mellinger looks at the relationship between time and poetry from the point of view of Ricoeur's discussions of the connection between time and narrative, and T. Peter Kemp extends Ricoeur's analysis to argue that narration is indispensable to ethics. The book concludes with a reflection by Ricoeur himself on the linguistic, practical, and ethical dimensions of human beings, and with a bibliography of Ricoeur's work in English. T. Peter Kemp teaches in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. The Narrative Pathis based on a special issue of the journal Philosophy and Social Criticism, edited by David Rasmussen, who is Professor of Philosophy at Boston College. (shrink)

The Clarke/Rowe version of the Cosmological Argument is sound only if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true, but many philosophers, including Rowe, think that there is not adequate evidence for the principle of sufficient reason. I argue that there may be indirect evidence for PSR on the grounds that if we do not accept it, we lose our best justification for an important principle of metaethics, namely, the Principle of Universalizability. To show this, I argue that all the other (...) justifications of the Principle of Universalizability on offer, including Richard Hare's, are inadequate. (shrink)

This article is not intended to state what I positively believe to be true, but to make a suggestion which I think it well-worth working out. The suggestion is not altogether unfamiliar, but it has certain implications that seem to have been so far overlooked, or at any rate have never been developed. I do not think that it is the duty of a philosopher to confine himself in his publications to working out theories of the truth of which he (...) is convinced.… It is a part of a philosopher's work, as it is of a scientist's, to try out tentative hypotheses and examine their advantages and disadvantages. (shrink)